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Institutionalism For What: To Understand 
Inevitable Progress or For Policy Relevance? 
F. Gregory Hayden 
In two recent papers, Anne Mayhew challenged the approach and 
purpose of institutionalism [Mayhew 1987a, 1987bl. Her message was 
that institutionalism should be concerned with describing cultures in 
order to understand the inevitable flow of human progress, and should 
not be undertaking analysis for the purpose of social evaluation and 
policy. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the insufficiency 
of the base upon which that message was constructed.' 
Western Biases Regarding Inevitable Progress 
Mayhew's view, although inconsistent with the history of institution- 
alism, is consistent with long-held Western biases. Stephen Gould has 
stated that "much of our evolutionary thinking reflects some of the 
deepest biases of Western thought" [Gould 1983, p. 951. "In a crazy 
reversal of causality, you see nature as existing for and directed towards 
us, as though nature for four and a half billion years existed only to 
cough us up at the end of time" [Gould, p. 1011. He defines the four 
great biases as: (1) progressionism, (2) gradualism, (3) determinism, and 
(4) adaptationism. These define history as a continuum of progressive 
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adaptations, that have deterministically led to the latest greatest cre- 
ation. At the center of and superior to the flora and fauna is the human 
species which, in addition, is created in the image of God. The socio- 
technical system of this superior being gradually evolved in a similar 
progressive and deterministic manner, so that "every creature and ev- 
ery human being has his appropriate status on the earth" [Gould 1983, 
p. 971. Therefore, there is no need for political change or policy action. 
Christianity is consistent with these biases. God's manifestation in 
the realm of the created universe is accomplished through "the com- 
mission to dominate which was given to the primordial man" [Benz 
1972, p. 4021. Consistent with the Christian view, "the whole develop- 
ment of industrial revolution and modern technology has ended in 
terms of a secularized proclamation of this domination" [Benz 1972, 
pp. 401-21. These Western biases are of course inconsistent with mod- 
em science and with instrumentalism. However, they have influenced 
economists to develop models that automatically lead to harmony, or 
equilibrium, or progress, or ideal stages, or proletarian utopias, or simi- 
lar fabrications. 
Mayhew's views are consistent with Western secular and Christian 
biases in that she posits inevitable and continuous progress and assures 
us that our culture and social institutions are the result of instrumental 
valuation [Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001. For Mayhew, policy analysis and 
social evaluation by institutionalists is unneeded. In addition, their pol- 
icy interest has a dangerous and misleading influence on scientific 
work. 
Institutionalism Emphasizes Evaluation 
Mayhew goes beyond advising institutionalists not to carry on evalu- 
ation by telling us that the evaluation of institutions was not an integral 
concern of the work of our intellectual ancestors. She offers neither ref- 
erences nor quotes. Let me offer quotes from them to show that they 
were in direct disagreement with Mayhew's view. Thorstein Veblen 
said of the businessman, "the vital point of production with him is the 
vendibility of the output, its convertibility into money values, not its 
serviceability for the needs of mankind" [Veblen 1904, pp. 50-5 11. This 
quote is not from a man who eschewed evaluation and judgment. Nei- 
ther did Clarence Ayres. To Ayres, the economist's job has always been 
one ofevaluation. "Economic thinking has always embodied some con- 
ception of progress and must always do so; for the concept of value is 
the chief concept of economic thinking, and progress is indissoluble 
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from value" [Ayres 1978, p. 23 11. Thus, according to Ayres's criterion, 
hlayhew misses the task of the economist. 
Karl Polanyi regularly evaluated economic institutions. For exam- 
ple, regarding the market system, he said, but "no society could stand 
the effects of such a system of crude fictions for the shortest stretch of 
time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business or- 
ganization was protected against the ravages of this satanic mill" [Po- 
lanyi 1944, p. 731. To say that Polanyi did not make evaluative 
judgments would require the rewriting of history. Anne Mayhew at- 
tempted that last summer at the London conference on insitutionalism 
when she stated that Polanyi did not say the market system was a harm- 
ful system. 
John Dewey, the father of instrumentalism, regularly made evalu- 
ative judgments. An example is when he wrote about the forces that 
"brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that 
demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrument of an 
inclusive and fraternally associated public" [Dewey 1954, p. 1091. 
James Street agreed that evaluation has been a hallmark of institu- 
tionalism. He said "for Veblen, there was no credible evidence of.  . . a 
beneficent self adjusting system, and on the contrary, he held that the 
history of industrializing nations revealed strong dynamic forces . . . in 
which ultimate outcome was by no means predictable" [Street 1987, p. 
18651. 
Policy is a Primary Concern of Znstitutionalism 
Even though institutionalism is traditionally associated with policy 
studies, Mayhew says it should not be because of the "extraordinary 
discovery" that "as we discover, measure, and define problems we also 
discover, measure, and define  solution^"^ [Mayhew 1987b, p. 81. Her 
statement is a tautology, and the proposition she defines is inevitable 
progress. She says "that is what I think was so impressive to those who 
created the intellectual tradition that we call institutionalism" [May- 
hew, 1987b, p. 81. 
Her view is inconsistent with institutionalism. Polanyi says that the 
substantive or institutional approach to the economy always leads to 
policy. For him policy, not process, determines alternative technology 
as well as alternative ways of instituting technology. This "conceptual 
distinction is vital for any understanding of the interdependence of 
technology and institutions as well as their relative independence" [Po- 
lanyi 1957, p. 2491. "The instituting of the economic process . . . centers 
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interest on values, motives, and policy" [Polanyi 1957, pp. 249-501. To 
that we can add Dewey's comment that modern science "is an art of 
control" [Dewey 1979, p. 2881. Geoffrey Hodgson, in his recent mani- 
festo for a modern institutional economics, states that the principal in- 
dictment against economic theory is its "failure . . . to generate policy 
prescriptions" [Hodgson 1988, p. 41. Numerous other institutionalists 
have made similar statements. William Melody, for example, recently 
stated that institutionalists now have an opportunity to change the 
world [Melody 1987, p. 13371. 
Comion  About Instrumentalism 
Anne Mayhew never quotes from or references any of the instrumen- 
tal philosophers, and her conceptualization of instrumentalism is in- 
consistent with their work. 
First, her admonition stated above, against evaluation of institutions 
and the making of policy, is in conflict with instrumentalism. W.H. 
Werkmeister explained that, with respect to evaluation "what Dewey 
means to examine in particular is .  . . 'the process of deliberating upon 
an ethical or economic problem"' [Werkmeister 1973, p. 421. This is 
consistent with Dewey's use of "the expression 'ethical judgment' and 
'economic judgment' as synonymous with 'judgment of valuation"' 
[Werkmeister 1973, p. 5 11. From as early as William James's writing, 
we learn that "the pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret 
each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences" [James 
1907, p. 441. 
Second, Mayhew seems to identify almost any human thought pro- 
cess as the instrumental aspect. However, all reasoning is not instru- 
mental thought. Neither are attempts at intuition, nor all uses of 
rational models, nor the use of common sense. Instrumental valuing 
and valuation is a "distinctive sort," which must rely on complex mod- 
els and articulated knowledge collected and processed consistent with 
valid methods and with the particular context in which the problem is 
embedded. 
When Mayhew says that she cannot practice "instrumental effective- 
ness" because she "cannot see into the futurew4 [Mayhew 1987b, p. 111, 
she disassociates herself from Dewey, who said that "the involved fore- 
sight, forecast, or anticipation is warranted. . . in the degree in which 
it is based upon propositions that are conclusions of adequate observa- 
tional activities" [Dewey 1939, p. 521. Allan Gruchy recognized this 
when he said of the cultural economist, "in the case of the members of 
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the holistic school, his scientific analysis will be tilted toward the fu- 
ture" [Gruchy 1967, p. 251. 
A further disassociation takes place when she says that the question, 
"Will means chosen serve as instruments in the achievement of ends- 
in-view?" cannot be asked5 [Mayhew 1987b, pp. 8-91. Dewey said, "the 
required appraisal of desires and ends-in-view, as means of the activi- 
ties by which actual results are produced, is dependent upon observa- 
tion of consequences attained when they are compared and contrasted 
with the content of ends-in-view" [Dewey 1939, p. 521. 
Finally, her definition of instrumentalism as some kind of natural 
elemental human aspect that automatically provides for human prog- 
ress [Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001 is not consistent with William James, 
Charles Peirce, John Dewey, George Mead and Sidney Hook, all of 
whom emphasized that instrumentalism is about inquiry and method 
directed at practical problems to find policy solutions, or, as Street ex- 
plained, "instrumental valuation was concerned with the intellectual 
selection of future alternative actions" [Street 1987, p. 18661. 
Description is Normative and Facts are not Given 
As Anne Mari May and John R. Sellers explained, any attempts at 
non-normative analysis and description are futile [May and Sellers 
19881. When Mayhew speaks of "facts" or "empirical" or "description," 
she indicates that they are separate from the normative issues. By using 
the terms she seems to believe that she has conveyed a finality. How- 
ever, "facts do not exist independently of scientific theories; what is 
construed as a fact depends upon one's theoretical framework. . . . Thus 
the 'subjective' perspective of the scientist influences the collection of 
the 'objective' data" [May and Sellers 1988, p. 4001. 
There is no description that is not laden with values, beliefs, and phil- 
osophical decisions; facts more so than most analytical entities. In ad- 
dition, facts and measurement are more abstract than the other entities. 
In conducting description and analysis, fact gathering and measure- 
ment follow beliefs, problem definition, method, scope, and so forth. 
Facts must be created by humans who must make judgments about cri- 
teria, research design, gathering techniques and so forth. By the time a 
fact is gathered, judgment has been stacked upon judgment, and crite- 
rion upon criterion. With regard to cultural facts, "anthropologists are 
no less aware than other scientists (at least if they are it's not for want 
of being told) that facts are not 'given,' but constructed, with the inevi- 
table help of concepts" [Beattie 1984, p. 21. Thus when Mayhew says 
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"there is no empirical e~idence,"~ as if that statement would provide a 
base of authority, she is incorrect [Mayhew 1987b, p. 41. It does not. It 
only begs questions. 
When she says that to be concerned about "what ought to 
be . . . reduces emphasis on analysis and description ofspecific patterns 
of culturew7 [Mayhew 1987a, p. 5991, she is wrong. The "ought" is in- 
volved in all analysis. Gunnar Myrdal explained that "there is an ines- 
capable a priori element in all scientific work." As he said, "biases are 
thus not confined to the practical and political conclusions drawn from 
research" [Myrdal 1969, p. 91. In addition, to be concerned about what 
ought to be and the policy needed to achieve it, requires description. 
It emphasizes analysis and is explicit about the ideological base of de- 
scription. 
Dewey wrote extensively about measurement and facts. He ex 
plained that the aggregation of discrete items is not measurement, it is 
mere counting [Dewey 1938, p. 21 I]. Yet it is the aggregation of output 
that Mayhew suggests as an indication of nineteenth-century progress 
[Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001. 
The Logic is Peccable 
The logical constructs Mayhew uses to make some of her major 
points are less than impeccable. Let me comment on some ofthe logical 
problems. 
Fallacy of Composition: 
Numerous times Mayhew says that institutionalists' policy interest 
comes about through the fallacy of composition (See Mayhew [1987a, 
pp. 587 and 5971). However, the fallacy of composition is an isomor- 
phic concept that is inconsistent with the holism practiced by institu- 
tionalists. Institutionalists believe in sociotechnical models that are 
transactional. They do not look at the parts to find the whole; they use 
nonisomorphic normative systems based on deontic logic. Thus the fal- 
lacy does not apply to the transactional context. 
Association: 
Mayhew associates institutionalists with some modem anthropolo- 
gists with whom she disapproves and then condemns them with guilt 
by association [Mayhew 1987, p. 5931. However she offers neither cri- 
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teria for nor tests of association. Until tests of association are designed 
and applied, the association is just an accusation. 
Internal Znconsrstency 
Mayhew's statement that institutionalists should not evaluate and 
offer policy advice about cultural patterns and social processes [May- 
hew, 1987a, p. 6021 is internally inconsistent because in saying it she is 
offering policy advice about a social process. Science is a social process. 
She is advising us to change our beliefs and behavioral habits, and 
therefore our social institution. 
Her argument is also internally inconsistent when she disagrees with 
the idea that "continuing functions serve as standards against which 
structures (institutions) can be judgedw8 [Mayhew 1987b, p. 61. That is 
the same criterion utilized by Mayhew for endorsing her elemental hu- 
man aspect as the source of instrumental valuing. Her argument is that 
it is continuous in all societies. 
Exclusion: 
Mayhew regularly uses exclusion improperly. For example, with re- 
gard to the way that institutions should be treated: "whether described 
and analyzed or condemned as irrelevant to human progress; whether 
perceived as the fundamental regulators of human behavior or simply 
as hindrances to the creation of a better s ~ c i e t y " ~  [Mayhew 1987a, p. 
5971. What she is describing as exclusive are not exclusive. It would 
not be possible to know what to condemn without description and anal- 
ysis. One can perceive institutions as both regulators of human behav- 
ior and as hindrances to a better society. How could they hinder if they 
cannot regulate? How would one know without description and analy- 
sis? 
Tautologies: 
Mayhew has utilized a number of tautologies. One is her insistence 
that all people in all tribes throughout history have utilized instrumen- 
tal reasoning [Mayhew 1987a, p. 5871. There is never any indication 
given about what criteria would be used to test that idea. It is a hypoth- 
esis that serves as its own proof, it is defined to be true. 
A more serious tautology is her statement that the "instrumental as- 
pect was both source and measure of human progress"I0 [Mayhew 
1987a, p. 6001. If aspect is source, and aspect is also measure, then the 
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source is the measure because she has defined it to be so. However, a 
horse can not be used to measure itself and neither can an aspect. Meas- 
urement and evaluation, (for example, determining progress) must 
reach to outside criteria. Otherwise, the neoclassicalists are correct in 
using prices to measure and judge a price system. 
She then added that "recognition. . . was the reason why the. . . as- 
pect . . . assumed importance in institutional thoughtW1l [Mayhew 
1987a, p. 6001. No. Recognition of an entity is not proof. Institution- 
alists need more than recognition for proof of importance. 
Reasonable and Rational: 
Professor Mayhew needs to begin anew with regard to her concerns 
for reason and rationality. These words have a history and particular 
definition in philosophy and economics. That is where she should be- 
gin. She says that "most people, most of the time, reason reasonably 
rationally" and later she adds "rational, or reasonably so"12 [Mayhew 
1987a, p. 6011. This is just washing word over word. What do those 
statements mean? 
She also has conflicting statements with regard to rationality. She dis- 
approves when the formalists say peasants are rational [Mayhew 1987a, 
p. 5891, yet three pages later she approvingly says, "social individuals 
attempt to be rational" [Mayhew 1987a, p. 5921. Nine pages later she 
disapproves of the rationality bandwagon "which assumed rationality 
of so many peoples"[Mayhew 1987a, p. 6011. Yet in the next paragraph 
she approves of social scientists' emphasis on "demirationality" [May- 
hew 1987a, p. 6011. 
Problem Definit~on: 
Mayhew said, "note that identification of .  . . a problem does not re- 
quire use of the instrumental value principle" [Mayhew 1987b, p. 71. 
"We do not need . . . to identify problems because the real world prob- 
lems with which we deal as economists are ones that emerge"I3 [May- 
hew, 1987b, p. 71. (In the Western tradition of deterministic 
emergence). I know of no support for that view. If she has ever worked 
in a public policymaking office she knows the difficulty of trying to de- 
fine real world problems. Experienced policymakers are not going to 
agree with her. The system dynamics people say the opposite, as do 
those with expertise in technology assessment. Clarence Ayres once 
said in class that people most needed help in defining their problems 
because their most serious problems are many times the result of the 
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beliefs to which they are the most committed. John Dewey devoted 
great attention to the difficulty of the identification of a problem and 
wrote a book The Public and its Problems in which he explained the 
need for expertise on problem definition [Dewey 1954, p. 1351. 
From a holistic frame there are two logical flaws with regard to her 
view on problem definition. First, we cannot expect the perceptions of 
the parts to reflect the problems of the whole in a nonisomorphic sys- 
tem. As Dewey said, "since the very need for inquiry shows that there 
is a problem set by the existing situation, there can be no understanding 
of it achieved until there are new connections established" [Dewey 
1979, p. 1761. Second, and closely related, Dewey stated, "as organisms 
become more complex in structure and thus related to a more complex 
environment, the importance of a particular act in establishing condi- 
tions favorable to subsequent acts that sustain the continuity of the life 
process, becomes at once more difficult and more imperative" [Dewey 
1979, p. 2241. Thus the formation of "a problem for inquiry is perfected 
by the method of conceiving and defining objects through operations 
which have as their consequence accurate metric statements of changes 
correlated with changes going on elsewhere" [Dewey 1979, p. 1341. 
Universality: 
Mayhew has confused universal traits with the application of univer- 
sal models and has conflicting statements regarding both. My concern 
here is with universal models. She adversely criticizes investigators 
who use the same models and concepts and who apply them to different 
groups in different areas of the world. Those investigators utilize, to use 
her words, "wondrous multi-purpose models" [Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001. 
The inconsistency is that Mayhew is doing the same. She is applying 
concepts such as culture, society, institutions, beliefs, social processes, 
cultural patterns and so forth and she is applying these to all societies 
and cultures. 
Context 
The problem is not that Mayhew applies the same concepts to all 
groups. The problem is two-fold. First, she has failed to complicate her 
models and concepts in a way to capture the complexity of the real 
world.14 As Clifford Geertz has said, with regard to the social sciences, 
"seek complexity and order it" [Geertz 1965, p. 171. We need for Profes- 
sor Mayhew to help us incorporate the findings of modern social and 
psychological sciences. We also need her assistance in deciding on 
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which of the many models that have been developed are the most ap- 
plicable in particular contexts. Before analysis and policy can be com- 
pleted, the relevant context must be articulated. 
Second, she has failed to refine her concepts. She defines culture to 
include everything (institutions, processes, patterns, and technology). 
It is too broad to be useful. At least as early as 1917, Alfred Kroeber 
was calling for taking account of distinctions between the mental and 
the cultural [Kroeber 191 71. In 1929 Bemhard Stem emphasized the 
distinction between society and culture [Montagu 1974, p. 3461; how- 
ever, Mayhew still does not make such a distinction. Leslie White con- 
tinued to frame and refine the distinctions in a way that allowed for the 
current distinctions made among beliefs, values, society, institutions, 
culture, social processes, attitudes, structure, and so forth [White 19591. 
Mayhew's failure to use modem conceptual definitions leads to some 
of her problems. An example is her unique definition of society "as a 
group of people" [Mayhew 1987b, p. 8].15 Society usually is defined as 
a set of relationships. Mayhew creates a problem by not using such a 
definition. She raises the issue of the change in opinion in the United 
States concerning when people should retire. She says this clarifies the 
failure of the instrumental value principle because we can observe opin- 
ion changes "when we compare the same society at different times" 
[Mayhew 1987b, p. 1 I]. That is not correct. It is a new society; society 
has changed. The set of relationships has changed. It is a new society 
even though the group might be said to be the same. Thus, with a new 
context, we should expect opinions to change with regard to policy. 
For the holistic economists, validity is to be contextual. Therefore 
we need the best and most refined tools available to describe the con- 
text. 
Notes 
1. Some colleagues have related that these papers depend on invidiousness 
because of terms such as: "triviality of analyses of choosing", "creation of 
basic sticker-price homosapiens", "hysterical rejection", "driven by as- 
sumption", "in less cautious hands", "hysterical calls for abandonment", 
"enshrined in recent institutionalist thought", "tendency to confuse", "im- 
perialistic biologists and economists", "purveyors of wondrous multi- 
purpose models", and so forth [Mayhew 1987a, 1987bl. In addition, the 
two following paragraphs attribute unflattering characteristics and motiva- 
tions to institutionalists. 
Commission of the fallacy is easy and tempting because it appears to 
provide a short-cut to understanding other people and to providing 
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measures of adequacy that are something other than our own "home 
truths. "Traditional history and traditional anthropology are hard be- 
cause logic and our own reason do not tell us what happened or hap- 
pens; history and anthropology become easier if patterns are logically 
or reasonably derivable. The temptation to take an easier route is fa- 
miliar to institutionalists who have been tempted to brush aside be- 
havior patterns as imbecile, encapsulating, lagging impediments to 
technological progress. In this institutionalist version of EHS, cultural 
variations become relics of some earlier rationality and messy and 
hard detail becomes irrelevant detail. 
The danger is that when cultures come to be seen as either the con- 
sequence of rational or reasonable processes, or simply as imbecile 
leftovers, they lose much of their importance in explaining human 
behavior and we revert to a dangerous ethnocentrism. Adoption of an 
elemental human strategy can transform specific cultural patterns into 
"mere constraints" or into irrelevancies; and we then lose our ability 
to grasp, even dimly, how bound we are by our own cultural patterns 
[Mayhew 1987a, pp. 601-2, emphasis added]. 
The argument is that the terms and attributions are used to undermine 
the credibility and question the responsibility of scientists who disagree 
with Mayhew. I disagree that the arguments in her articles are dependent 
on the degree of invidiousness of those terms; therefore, that issue is not 
covered in this article. If I were to surmise, my guess would be that a greater 
problem was created by the "alarm" and "agitation" Mayhew conveys in 
the articles. 
2. For clarity, only those parts of Mayhew's sentences or paragraphs that are 
relevant to the particular point being addressed will be included in the text. 
However her original text will be included in the notes below so the reader 
will know the quotes were selected consistent with the original context. 
Emphasis will be added to the parts of her text that were quoted by the 
author in this article. 
3. "The extraordinary discovery was that even as we (meaning a society, a 
group of people) discover, measure, and define problems we also discover, 
measure and define solutions" [Mayhew 1987b, p. 81. 
4. "What is most interesting is that both the problem, and the solutions that 
appeal to Marc and to me, have been developed by society. That is what 
I think was so impressive to those who created the intellectual tradition we 
call rnstitutionalism" [Mayhew, 1987b, p. 81. 
5. "When Marc says that the relevant questions are: 'Will means chosen serve 
as instrurncnts in the achievement of ends-in-view? Will such ends-in-view 
as means be instrumental in securing further desired conse- 
quences? . . . Thus his first question cannot be asked"[Mayhew 1987b, pp. 
8-91. 
6. "There is no empirical evidence for either statement" [Mayhew 1987b, p. 41. 
7. "Transforming the aspect of instrumental valuing into a suitable strategy 
for saying what ought to be and making it the most important of the institu- 
tionalist tools, demotes the concept of culture. Not only is strong relativism 
rejected, the strategy reduces emphasis on analysis and description of spe- 
c!fic patterns of  culture" [Mayhew 1987a, p. 5991. 
644 F. Gregory Hayden 
8. "That is, the continuing functions serve as standards against which struc- 
tures (institutions) can be judged" [Mayhew 1987b, p. 61. (This is the com- 
plete statement Mayhew uses to summarize Marc Tool's view). 
9. "A number of disputes and arguments among institutionalists seem to 
resolve themselves into two fundamental issues: . . . 
(2) the way or ways in which 'institutions, should be treated in insti- 
tutional analysis: whether described and analyzed or condemned as ir- 
relevant to human progress; whether perceived as the fundamental 
regulators of human behavior or simply as hindrances to the creation 
o f  a better society" [Mayhew 1987a, p. 5971. 
10. "There was, they both insisted, an Elemental Human Aspect-the instru- 
mental aspect-to the way in which people processed and valued informa- 
tion, and insisted that the instrumental aspect was both source and measure 
o f  hurt~an progress"[Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001. 
1 1. "If recognition of the reality of human progress was the reason why the ele- 
mental human aspect (in the form of instrumental valuing) assumed impor- 
tance in institutional thought. . . "[Mayhew 1987a, p. 6001. 
12. "If we move from the proposition that most people, most of the time, reason 
reasonablv  rational,^ with the knowledge at hand, to the assumption that 
the patterns of behavior, the institutions, the culture of any people are 
therefore rational, or reasonably so, then we have committed the fallacy of 
composition" [Mayhew 1987a. p. 6011. 
13. "First, note that identiJication of employment and unemployment as a 
prohlern does not require use of the instrumental value principle. The point 
at which I am driving is that we do not need, as Marc suggests that we do, 
a value principle to identxv problems because the real worldproblems with 
which deal as economists are ones that emerge in the process of socio- 
economic evolution" [Mayhew, 1987b, p. 71. 
14. Included in quote in note 3 above [Mayhew 1987b, p. 81. 
15. Mayhew does not consider any of the complex systems' literature. 
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